Columbus, Ohio — In the complex intersection of federal and state laws concerning election conduct, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) has been brought to the forefront amid New York’s prosecution of former President Donald Trump. Legal experts and commentators have been busy debating whether FECA preempts state law in matters related to electoral processes and candidate behaviors.
Recently, arguments made by Elizabeth Price Foley, a professor at Florida International University, and David Rivkin, a conservative media commentator, claim that the FECA should nullify New York’s charges against Trump for falsifying business records to influence a federal election. Their stance highlights a provision in FECA that suggests federal election laws should override state statutes in matters of federal elections. However, not all legal scholars agree with this interpretation.
The debate centers around a fundamental constitutional principle—the Supremacy Clause, which clarifies that federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land,” taking precedence over conflicting state laws. However, critics of Foley and Rivkin’s argument point out that the presence of preemption in FECA isn’t as clear-cut as it may appear. While Congress can override state regulations, the Constitution doesn’t obligate it to do so. This leaves room for state powers to endure unless Congress explicitly dictates otherwise.
Historically, FECA includes an express preemption clause intended to consolidate federal control over election regulations to ensure uniformity. However, courts have generally been cautious about extending this preemption to state laws that broadly apply to multiple facets of governance, beyond just electoral processes. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit a decade ago maintained that FECA does not prevent states from enforcing their fraud laws against federal political contributions, even if they are FECA compliant.
In similar cases, state laws around contract disputes, fiduciary responsibilities, and consumer protections involving federal candidates have also been upheld by lower courts, demonstrating a pattern of restraint in applying preemption broadly. Moreover, there is a notable distinction made by courts between state laws that specifically target or duplicate the regulatory areas covered by FECA—such as contribution limits and reporting requirements—and those that generally address broader legal responsibilities.
The issue gained specific legal scrutiny when federal Judge Alvin Hellerstein dismissed an attempt by Trump’s legal team to transfer his New York prosecution to a federal court. Judge Hellerstein articulated that FECA does not exempt a general state law from being applied to actions related to a federal election unless the law explicitly regulates conduct spelled out in FECA.
As the legal battle continues, the broader implications for the separation of state and federal electoral powers remain a point of contention. The waypoints laid out in this and similar cases will likely navigate future disputes over the extent and reach of electoral laws. The possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court may eventually weigh in provides additional drama to an already high-stakes legal interpretation issue.
Ultimately, legal scholars and observers eagerly await the appellate courts’ decision following the presidential election in November. Should the courts affirm New York’s stance, it could set a precedent that reinforces the autonomy states have in enforcing laws that impact federal elections, albeit non-specifically.
Professor Mark R. Brown from Capital University Law School in Ohio, who has been closely following these developments, suggests that while the debate is intricate, the foundation of New York’s case against Trump appears robust, despite counterclaims of federal preemption by FECA. This legal dialogue underscores the ongoing debate about the balance between federal authority and state sovereignty—an area that continuously evolves as new cases are presented and decided.